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Donor Action in Pakistan:  
A Comparative Case Study  
of CDIP and AAWAZ 
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March 2021 
Summary 
This paper analyses findings from a study of the Consolidating Democracy in 
Pakistan (CDIP) and AAWAZ Voice and Accountability programmes, both funded 
by the UK government. The study is a contribution to the A4EA Research 
Programme workstream ‘Unpacking Donor Action’. It is based on a secondary 
literature review, analysis of programme documents, and qualitative interviews with 
individuals who worked with these programmes at various levels. The analysis 
explores the interaction between the two programmes to argue they produced 
strong synergies as an outcome of their adaptive programming approach. The 
synergising took place under conditions of growing constraints on civic society and 
the democratic process during the programme life cycles. The paper concludes that 
the beneficial interaction effects were an outcome of strategic partnerships with a 
common implementing agency (DAI) and deep engagement with civil society 
organizations, but without empowered local government and on-going donor 
support the empowerment effects are difficult to sustain. 
Keywords 
Pakistan, democracy, DFID [FCDO], adaptive programming, interaction effects, 
AAWAZ, CDIP, empowerment, accountability. 
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This paper is an analysis of the interaction effects between two programmes 
funded by the UK government and implemented through the former Department 
for International Development (DFID), now the Foreign, Commonwealth and 
Development Office (FCDO) in Pakistan. These are the AAWAZ Voice and 
Accountability Programme and the Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan (CDIP) 
programme. Fox (2020) has argued that international development projects may 
have ‘contradictory effects on countervailing power for the excluded’, in that 
certain project measures may conflict with others. With this conceptualisation in 
mind, we argue that these two programmes interacted to produce strong 
synergies in their effects on the excluded. This developed as an outcome of their 
adaptive programming approach,1 which allowed AAWAZ to respond to findings 
on the ground and CDIP to engage with the former’s structure to valuable effect. 
This synergising took place under conditions of growing constraints on civic 
society and the democratic process in Pakistan during the programme life cycles. 
In addressing the core research question of how social and political action for 
empowerment and accountability is enabled and supported by donors working in 
specific fragile, conflict- and violence-affected settings (FCVAS), we asked: 
How did DFID’s analysis and approaches in designing, implementing and 
monitoring initiatives for empowerment and accountability in FCVAS relate the 
two concepts, and how did they document and analyse the contribution from the 
two programmes under comparison?  
Both AAWAZ and CDIP were born out of a political economy analysis (PEA) of 
Pakistan’s context. The programmes envisioned similar outcomes and impact 
with respect to strengthening democracy by making it more inclusive (AAWAZ) 
and more accountable to citizens (CDIP). CDIP’s Output 4 in its logframe, the 
expansion of democratic space overlapped most directly with AAWAZ’s Output 
1, women better able to participate in politics and public spaces. Both worked in 
successful partnership with leading advocacy and development NGOs which 
have been operating in Pakistan since the 1980s with an extensive track record 
of organising communities to advocate with government for increased citizens’ 
empowerment and the accountability of state institutions. The values and 




1  For more information on the adaptive programming approach see research from A4EA’s first phase 
(Christie and Green 2019).  
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 549 





The two DFID-administered programmes were consistent in their understanding 
and articulation of empowerment and accountability. This consistency was 
enhanced through a shared emphasis on gender empowerment to achieve 
programme goals, a shared use of Development Alternatives International (DAI) 
as an implementing partner which in turn worked with NGOs that shared the 
same vision of a participatory citizen-state compact. Both programmes used the 
same CAR (context, action, result) framework to measure voice and 
accountability. 
How did the programmes interact with one another and build partnerships with 
other key actors involved in empowerment and accountability, was there a 
discernible synergy and/or conflict in their roles?  
We find the interaction effects between AAWAZ and CDIP are a compelling 
example of adaptive programming in a fragile social and political context. DAI 
worked closely with donor staff to adapt programming strategies on the ground, 
and strong communication channels with community and NGO partnerships 
informed this process. When CDIP began, after AAWAZ was well underway, it 
was ideally positioned to build on AAWAZ’s existing partnerships to meet its 
goals. Further, both programmes used their monitoring and evaluation systems 
to document and analyse whether and how their activities contributed to 
empowerment and accountability. DAI’s adaptive approach responding to inputs 
from consortium partners and field staff led to key changes in the design of 
AAWAZ.  
What was DFID’s impact on the local context and local actors – how did the 
programmes enable ‘an enabling environment’ for social and political action in 
support of empowerment and accountability?  
During the programmes’ cycles civic spaces came under increasing state 
scrutiny and control, yet the programmes persisted towards fostering an enabling 
environment for social and political action in support of empowerment and 
accountability. Through their partnerships with non-state actors in civil society 
and establishment of citizen’s forums, they helped to off-set traditional elite 
capture of voice and accountability in local settings. We conclude that the 
beneficial interaction effects were an outcome of the common implementing 
agency’s (DAI’s) strategic partnerships and deep engagement with experienced 
NGOs and their community linkages, but without empowered local government 
and on-going donor support the empowerment effects on the ground are difficult 
to sustain. 
The discussion below offers evidence for the above assertions. First, we 
introduce Pakistan’s regime type, fragility, and conflict-related characteristics to 
set the local socio-political context for the two programmes, which motivated 
their design. Section II presents the recent history of DFID-administered 
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programmes in Pakistan. The subsequent sections lay out the case for the 
programmes’ comparative analysis (III), methodology (IV), and sub-national 
comparative contexts (V). Section VI compares the programme design and 
political analysis, including the theories of changes employed by each. We 
discuss their overlapping understanding of empowerment and accountability (VII) 
and then turn to their interaction effects as part of the adaptive programming 
adopted by both (VIII). This is followed by a brief review of their monitoring and 
evaluation design (IX). The last two sections outline how both programmes 
negotiated shrinking civic space (X), and their impacts on the context and actors 
for empowerment and accountability (XI).  
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Pakistan began its most recent democratic transition after a period of military rule 
under General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008). The return to full civilian rule was 
marked by power-sharing between leading political parties, elected governments 
completed their full tenures with two successful electoral transitions in 2013 and 
2018. In 2010 the 18th Amendment to the Constitution devolved more political 
power and resources to the provinces, fulfilling a longstanding demand for 
greater provincial autonomy. Pakistan’s previous classification as an 
authoritarian state appeared to be receding as the democratic transition gained 
momentum (Adeney 2017). 
Real progress towards greater democratisation has been mixed at best. Adeney 
(2017) classifies Pakistan as a hybrid regime, which can be assessed with 
respect to three dimensions: competitiveness, civil liberties, and the existence of 
reserved domains. After the 2013 elections it scored well on the measurement of 
competitiveness. This was partly due to the foiling of an attempt by the 
intelligence agencies to manoeuvre a hung parliament, progress towards 
universal suffrage, including increased women’s identity card registration, and 
higher general voter turnout. It scored lower against a measurement of civil 
liberties, due to its low standing on-press freedom, limitations on the freedom of 
political parties, and ongoing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. 
The third dimension, that of reserved domains, exhibited mixed results. Civilian 
control of external defence and internal security policy was relatively low and 
subject to military interference and intelligence agencies’ manipulation. The 
civilian government did retain some control over military appointments, medium 
control over public policy, and improved political party collaboration in a number 
of areas (Adeney 2017). 
Despite a series of successful national elections, remnants of authoritarian rule 
persist and may be growing. The elected government of the Pakistan Muslim 
League (N) in the province of Punjab fostered a culture of patronage politics 
which led to an increased ‘democratic deficit’ after 2013 (Javid 2019). The 2018 
election process led many observers to accuse the army of rigging it in favour of 
Imran Khan’s party (Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI)) (Hasan 2018). The 2018 
elections lacked the legitimacy of the two previous elections, civil liberties remain 
increasingly circumscribed, and policy formulation is more highly influenced by 
the military than in the previous two civilian governments.  
Thus, the state exhibits all the characteristics of Osaghae’s (2007) framework of 
fragility. It has weak political institutions and bad governance; it lacks legitimacy 
amongst segments of its citizenry and is unable to exercise effective jurisdiction 
over large swathes of its territory. It lacks social cohesion and developed 
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institutions of conflict management and resolution. And finally, it exhibits low 
levels of economic growth and development and corruption is widespread.  
Addressing Pakistan’s fragility is critical to the potential success of its 
development initiatives, which require improved measures of good governance 
and legitimacy from the state. Table 2.1 presents Pakistan’s ranking on selected 
development indicators, revealing mixed improvement over the past decade. 
While the annual GDP growth rate has increased to 5.83 per cent (Trading 
Economics 2020) it is not enough to match the needs of its population of 220 
million, expanding at just over 2 per cent per year (World Bank 2020). The 
Human Development Index (HDI) score has improved slightly, but the country’s 
global ranking has worsened. The new PTI government successfully canvassed 
on an anti-corruption platform in the 2018 elections, resulting in the prosecution 
of numerous opposition politicians. Finally, Pakistan’s ranking on the Gender 
Inequality Index is the lowest in South Asia. 
Table 2.1. Pakistan’s development ranking by 
global index 














120/180 32/100 134/183 2.5/10 
Human Development Index 
(2020)b 
152/189 0.560 145/187c 0.504 
Gross Domestic Product 
(2018)d 
 5.83%  2.748% 
Gender Inequality Index 
(2018)b 
136/162 0.547 115/146e 0.573 
Sources: Authors’ own based on a. Transparency International (2020) b. UNDP (2020) c. UNDP (2011)  
d. World Bank (2020) and e. Hausmann et. al. (2011) 
The period after 9/11 and the global ‘War on Terror’ generated an indigenous 
Taliban conflict on Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan that engulfed its semi-
autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the province of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), along with other pockets of the country. The 
authoritarian regime under General Pervez Musharraf benefitted from Western 
political support and a wave of improved international development assistance in 
return for Pakistan’s support for the War on Terror. It took a series of military 
operations, the last of which came under a civilian government in 2015, to quell 
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the Taliban uprising. Millions were displaced in the process, and over fifty 
thousand civilians and combatants lost their lives. In 2018, FATA was officially 
merged into KP province. 
Political discontent and rebellion festers across the four main provinces. The 
nationalist insurgency in Balochistan is ongoing, with much of the province under 
close military surveillance and normal civilian life there is disrupted. A new social 
movement in KP, the youth-led Pashtoon Tahaffuz Movement (PTM), is both 
anti-military and anti-Taliban. In 2018, its public meetings began to attract 
thousands of supporters although some of its leaders have been charged with 
sedition and labelled anti-state. 
Punjab is the most populous and prosperous province in Pakistan, yet fragility 
prevails in its southern districts. The jihadi militant groups Lashkhar-e-Jhangvi 
and Jaish-e-Mohammed, linked to terrorist attacks inside the country and in 
India, are active in its poorly developed, highly feudal southern belt. Social 
cohesion in local communities has been undermined by the sectarian and radical 
discourse of extremist madrassas, or seminaries, which continue to operate and 
enlist poor students. Local service-delivery and advocacy NGOs are subject to 
restrictions on their activity in the name of security concerns (International Crisis 
Group 2016). 
Civil society helps to strengthen the accountability of the development process in 
support of the rule of law, service delivery, corruption control and policy 
monitoring (Hossain et al. 2018). In Pakistan civil society has had a varied 
relationship of co-optation, confrontation and cooperation with the state (Khan 
2001). When General Musharraf brought some leading development technocrats 
into his government the relationship with some leading civil society organisations 
temporarily improved. His relationship with civil society then soured after the 
Lawyer’s Movement mobilised national protests against his removal of the 
Supreme Court Chief Justice, which hastened the end of Musharraf’s rule in 
2007 (Khan 2019). 
The government’s relationship with civil society has worsened as an increasingly 
securitised governance paradigm has come to dominate the state’s interaction 
with NGOs and citizen mobilisations since 2007. Elected governments deploy 
the security discourse to restrict civic space and selectively delegitimise civil 
society actors, in particular advocacy and rights-based organisations. Mohmand 
(2019) describes how spaces closed for groups receiving international funds, 
and those espousing liberal and democratic human rights agendas after the 
2013 elections brought PML (N) into power. Social movements, such as the 
Okara peasant rebellion, advocates of minority rights and empowerment of 
marginalised groups, came under extreme pressure with increasing 
securitisation after 2017 that created a hostile environment for journalists and 
human rights activists. There have been several instances of abductions and 
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disappearances, and even peaceful protestors put at risk of being dispersed by 
force under the pretext of anti-terrorism laws (Mohmand 2019: 13). Under the 
current regime, a series of new regulations and legal frameworks have limited 
NGOs’ registration process, access to funds and interfere with their governance 
structures. During 2019 a number of national NGOs have been de-registered by 
the government, including those partnering with donor agencies on major 
programmes.  
The political momentum for these enhanced measures against NGOs increased 
as terrorist attacks, sectarian violence, and attacks on religious minorities 
intensified (Mohmand 2019). After the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden on 
Pakistani soil, allegedly with the indirect assistance of a US NGO functionary, a 
wave of anti-Western sentiment and sense of insecurity provided security 
agencies with greater impetus to discredit and restrict international NGO 
activities, thereby affecting both the funding of and programmes for rights-based 
activities benefitting religious minorities, women and marginalised communities. 
The sense of insecurity served the interests of the political and religious right in 
Pakistan which have a long history of challenging the moral legitimacy of rights-
based NGOs on the suspicion that they serve Western political agendas (Khan 
2018). 
Mohmand (2019) argues the implications of closing civic spaces for development 
outcomes are three-fold. First, the poor and marginalised experience greater 
difficulty accessing health and education services, as many NGOs are important 
service-providers in their communities. Second, there are high human and 
organisational costs to NGOs as they adapt to a ‘chilling environment’, and, 
finally, the role of civil society and media to act as watchdogs on macroeconomic 
management and corruption is minimised. All field research activities in Pakistan 
now require a ‘No Objection Certificate’ from a new body comprised of district 
administration and security agencies, with obvious implications for knowledge 
production and evidence-based policy outcomes. A number of organisations are 
no longer permitted to operate and the difficulties in obtaining permission to 
conduct research reduce the frequency and scope of studies. 
Mohmand (2019) posits the political implications of closing civic spaces will be a 
loss of international standing due to Pakistan’s sudden closure of leading 
international and national NGOs and consequent inability to meet its international 
development commitments such as the SDGs. It is likely to suffer a credibility 
deficit as a democratic and accountable government due to the restrictions it 
places upon civil society space, forcing actors to pay high personal, professional 
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Table 2.2 Pakistan scores on World Democracy 
Index 















2018 112 4.17 6.08 5.36 2.22 2.5 4.71 
2013 107 4.64 6 5.36 2.78 3.75 5.29 
2008 108 4.46 6.08 5.71 1.11 4.38 5 
Source: Authors’ own based on Economist Intelligence Unit (2018). 
Pakistan’s rankings on the World Democracy Index fell during the democratic 
transition period covering three national elections (Table 2.2). The areas showing 
the most decline, political culture and civil liberties, have been negatively 
impacted by the restrictions on civic space and the mainstream media, arrests of 
political activists, etc. Whilst the score of political culture has decreased, it is 
based partly on the World Values Survey measure of current public support for 
authoritarian or military rule, which has increased, while perception of the 
benefits of democracy has decreased. The civil liberties score, based on expert 
opinion with respect to the freedom of electronic and print media, public 
expression and protest, freedom of association, and the rights and freedoms of 
citizens, amongst others, has also declined (Civicus 2016, 2017, 2018). New 
laws limit freedom of expression in the media and by the public, and curtail 
internet freedom.2 These developments reveal less consolidation and more 
contestation over maintaining the spaces in civil society and political culture so 
vital to consolidating democracy.  
Religious freedom in Pakistan is restricted through laws and policies that 
undermine the rights of minorities. Blasphemy is punishable by death, and laws 
contribute to increasing the vulnerability of Shias, Sufis, members of the 
Ahmadiyya sect,3 and Christians to targeting by law enforcement officials and 
local communities. In some cases, accusations have led to death sentences. In 
2012, militants were involved in numerous attacks on minority communities and 
the desecration of religious sites, fuelling sectarian tensions and generating an 
environment of fear (United States Department of State 2013). 
The highest number of sectarian incidents in recent years occurred at the peak 
of Taliban militancy in 2007, with 341 incidents. The numbers of those killed 
continued to rise until 2013, when over 500 died in that year. The violence 
 
2  These are the Protection of Pakistan Act (2014) and Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (2016). 
3  They were officially declared non-Muslim in a 1974 constitutional amendment, and later forbidden from 
practicing as Muslims.  
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tapered off dramatically during the period of the civilian government led by 
Nawaz Sharif’s PML(N) from 2013, which saw only 16 incidents (but 231 killed) 
in its last full year in power in 2017 (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2020). 
Gender inequality is one of the most serious development challenges facing any 
government in Pakistan (Table 2.1). It impacts Pakistan’s global standing and 
legitimacy as a state capable of delivering to its citizens. Its current gender 
development index score puts it in the group of countries with the lowest equality 
achievements in the world (UNDP 2019). Pakistan has the lowest gender parity 
ranking in South Asia and sits almost at the bottom globally (ranked 151/153).  
The state’s fragility and the typology of local conflicts have constrained its will 
and capacity to deliver on gender development commitments. Women’s rights 
are a recurring theme in right-wing political discourse, which seeks to limit 
women’s role in the public sphere and curtail their personal rights in the name of 
Islam. The policy of Islamisation was used as a justification for the suppression 
of women’s rights under the military regime of General Zia ul-Haq during the 
1980s and persists amongst religious political parties in 2020. State-led 
Islamisation has been accompanied by the spread of religious education 
organisations, including madrassas and women’s groups, which espouse a 
highly patriarchal view of women’s role in society as complementary, but lower, 
to men. The Pakistani Taliban made use of the same call to Islamise the state 
and society. It implemented severe restrictions on women’s and religious 
minorities’ rights and freedoms in areas under its control during the border 
conflict (Khan 2018).  
Violence against women is an issue that tops the agenda of the women’s 
movement, with leading advocacy NGOs conducting research, supporting policy 
and legal reforms, and working within communities to stem the practices that 
perpetuate it. Donor agencies provide support to these efforts, helping to fuel a 
backlash from conservative forces that accuse women activists of following a 
‘Western’ agenda (Khan 2018). Recent successes include laws established 
during the past decade to curb rape, honour killings, early marriages, acid 
crimes, sexual harassment, and domestic violence. The legislation has yet to 
have an impact upon the lives of ordinary women because the laws lack 
adequate implementation mechanisms and awareness amongst the public and 
criminal justice system about their existence. A national survey carried out by the 
Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), National University of Ireland 
Galway, Ipsos Mori, and the International Centre for Research on Women (2019) 
found that women with tertiary education are less vulnerable to violence, as are 
those married before 18 years old, and women from areas where local 
authorities and police are not trusted. Fragility in governance, accountability and 
lack of social cohesion appear to be factors perpetuating the high rates of 
violence against women (SPDC et al. 2019) 
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3. The donor environment  
Pakistan is historically highly dependent on international aid to support its 
development sector. International support in return for its support during the 
post-9/11 War on Terror provided much-needed financing to the military 
government led by General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2007). This international 
support continued for the civilian regimes during the democratic transition that 
followed. The major development aid agencies operating currently are the United 
Nations agencies (led by UNDP), World Bank, Asian Development Bank, USAID, 
UK Aid (DFID), European Union, JICA and a selection of smaller bilateral 
donors. 
Donor support in KP and the former FATA seeks to address under-development 
as one of the key drivers of militancy and conflict in the region. The World Bank, 
USAID and EU are the major donor stakeholders in KP, with programmes which 
seek to revive the conflict-affected economies of KP and FATA, assist displaced 
persons, and support women and communities (see Annex 1). Bilateral, mainly 
Western, donors and the Japanese government also provide support. Table 4.2 
provides an overview of DFID’s (now FCDO’s) programming in Pakistan. It is the 
largest bilateral donor, running major programmes in health and nutrition, 
education, rule of law, democratic consolidation and economic development. It 
recently concluded a major provincial health and nutrition programme, EVA-BHN 
(£160m) to improve women and child health and increase the capacity of citizens 
and civil society to demand accountable public services. It will soon conclude a 
large educational support programme to the government of KP to support mainly 
girls’ education (£283m). Its support in the health sector also extends to 
additional programmes for nutrition interventions and family planning services.  
DFID also provides extensive support to conflict-affected FATA, to assist in the 
area’s recovery, improve governance, and support its recent integration into the 
province of KP. This support was complemented by a KP programme to 
strengthen the judicial system and improve citizen’s access to the courts and 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. This funding is directed to UNDP, 
which works directly with the government. Another DFID programme in both KP 
and Punjab, administered through an implementing agency, supported sub-
national governance by assisting local communities and provincial governments 
to respond more efficiently to citizen’s demands. It overlapped in some districts 
with the AAWAZ Voice and Accountability Programme. 
The UK government has one major programme with an explicit focus on 
strengthening democratic processes in Pakistan through supporting institutions 
and the capacity of parliament and politicians, and improving citizen’s 
engagement in electoral processes. Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan 
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(CDIP) is administered partially through the UNDP, programmed as a 
component of the Strengthening Electoral and Legislative Processes (SELP) 
project. The second main project under CDIP, branded as ‘Tabeer’, was 
implemented through the international agency DAI. One of its outputs, to support 
democratic space, overlapped with AAWAZ 1, primarily a demand-side 
programme to strengthen citizen’s voices and support them to demand greater 
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4. The case for comparative analysis 
of programme interaction effects 
Using a comparative case study approach for the multi-country research, we 
initially planned to study interaction effects between programmes implemented 
through two different donors within the same country. Since DFID is a major 
donor in Pakistan running large programmes simultaneously in the provinces of 
Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa we decided to explore if the analytical 
questions pertaining to synergy and interaction effects between two of its 
programmes would yield rich insights and increase the depth of our comparative 
findings. We selected AAWAZ 1 and CDIP for the paired comparison based on a 
combination of practical and analytical reasons. The practical considerations 
arose from the need to secure ease of access to programme and downstream 
partners, without which this research would not have been possible. It is 
currently impossible to proceed with research in country without government 
permission.  
Table 4.1 provides an overview of AAWAZ and CDIP, based on its programme 
design and measurable outcomes (DFID 2018a and 2018c). The main analytical 
reason for selecting these programmes to compare was that they address 
different elements of the fragility, conflict, and gender inequality features 
discussed in the section above, and do so through a common vision yet 
emphasising demand and supply-side elements respectively. The paired 
comparison explores (a) the synergy between the two programmes, based on 
their territorial overlap in two provinces, common implementing partners, partially 
shared programme structure and local human resources; (b) how the 
programmes complemented each other as demand versus supply-side 
interventions; (c) whether their synergy differed in its impact across two 
subnational contexts; and (d) the implications of both programmes’ use of 
common social capital, i.e. local resource persons, for empowerment and 
accountability interventions in the context of Pakistan’s fragility.  
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Table 4.1 AAWAZ and CDIP overview 
Source: Authors’ own based on DFID 2018a and 2018c 





in Pakistan (CDIP) (2016-
2020) £26,966,118 
Impact  Stable, inclusive and 
tolerant democracy in 
Pakistan 
Consolidating democracy for 
sustainable stability and 
development in Pakistan  
Outcome Democratic processes in 
Pakistan are more open, 
inclusive and accountable 
to citizens.  
A democratic system in which 
government institutions are 
more capable, parliament is 
more accountable and the 
state as a whole is more 
responsive to the needs and 
aspirations of the Pakistani 
people. 
Outputs  1. Women better able to 
participate safely in politics 
and in public spaces at 
federal, provincial and 
local levels in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and 
Punjab. 
2. Citizens and 
communities better able to 
resolve disputes 
peacefully and work 
together for common 
solutions in KP and 
Punjab. 
3. Women and other 
excluded groups better 
able to demand improved 
delivery of services in KP 
and Punjab. 
4. Improved evidence 
generated, synthesised 
and communicated/ 
championed to political 
leaders/ elites in KP and 
Punjab. 
1.Election management and 
election oversight processes 
are more credible, 
transparent and inclusive. 
2.Parliamentary processes 
are more inclusive, and 
parliamentarians are more 
effective in holding 
government to account. 
3.Political parties across the 
mainstream political spectrum 
better represent, respond to 
and deliver for their 
constituents. 
4.Expanded democratic 
space allows improved policy 
dialogue, political debate and 
public discourse. 
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Table 4.2 DFID (FCDO) administered programmes in Pakistan 
Programme Major outcomes Implementing partners 
Punjab Education Support 
Programme (2013-2020) 
£387,958,081  
To improve access, retention & quality of education in primary 
and secondary schools (Punjab). 
Oxford Policy Management  
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa 
Education Sector Programme 
(2011-2020) £283,200,858 
Improve primary & secondary education by providing technical 
assistance, financial aid & infrastructure to benefit all primary & 
lower secondary children. (KP) 
UNDP, UNOPS, Govt of KP 
EVA-BHN (2013-2019) 
£160,017,660 
Increase coverage &utilisation, particularly by poor, of 
reproductive, maternal, new-born, and child health (RMNCH) & 
nutrition services. (KP and Punjab). 
Palladium (UK), UNICEF, UNFPA, 
Population Services International. 
KP Merged Districts Support 
Programme (2018-2024) 
£108,839,996 
Basic health, education, rule of law, civilian peace-building, 
conflict prevention & resolution (KP and Punjab).   
UNDP 
Delivering Accelerated Family 
Planning in Pakistan (2017-
2022) £70,999,999 
Increase access to quality family planning information and 
services. (KP and Punjab). 
Population Services International 
Supporting Nutrition in Pak. 
(2014-2021) £59,389,939 
To improve nutritional status for people in Pakistan, particularly 
poorest women, girls and under 5 children. (KP and Punjab). 
Mott MacDonald Ltd, AECOM, 
IBRD 
Rule of Law in Pakistan 
Programme (2017-2020) 
£51,658,166 
This programme will support Pakistan to improve citizens’ trust 
and public confidence in rule of law, especially among the 
poorest and most vulnerable, including minorities, women and 
girls. This is an ODA and non-ODA integrated programme. (KP 
and Punjab).  
Adam Smith International  
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AAWAZ Voice & 
Accountability Programme 
(2012-2018)  £39,099,992  
Stable, inclusive and tolerant democracy in Pakistan whereby 
democratic processes are more open, inclusive and 





To improve the Pakistan provincial government’s capacity to 
respond more efficiently and effectively to the public service 
needs of the local communities. (KP and Punjab). 
Oxford Policy Management 
Consolidating Democracy in 
Pakistan (CDIP) (2016-2020) 
£26,966,118 
A democratic system in which government institutions are more 
capable, parliament is more accountable and the state is more 
responsive (KP and Punjab). 
UNDP and DAI 
AAWAZ II: Reducing 
Exploitation, Promoting 
Inclusion (2018 – 2024) 
£39,500,000 
Pakistani society and government institutions support 
increased voice, choice and control for marginalised groups, 
protect from exploitation, prevent discrimination and intolerance 
at all levels. (KP and Punjab). 
British Council, UNICEF, UNFPA, 
UN Women, DAI 




Support provincial economic development & sustainable 
energy; address Pakistan’s energy crisis by providing 
innovative financial solutions to industry; contribute to DFID's 
International Climate Fund (ICF) obligations. (KP and Punjab). 
IBRD 
Supporting Transparency, 
Accountability and Electoral 
Processes in Pakistan 
(STAEP) (2010-2014) 
£11,707,311 
Democratic processes in Pakistan are more open, inclusive, 
efficient and accountable to citizens. (KP and Punjab).  
Asia Foundation  
Supporting Electoral Reform 
in Pakistan (SERP) (2012-
2016) £5,679,997 
Stable, inclusive and tolerant democracy in Pakistan. (KP and 
Punjab).  
IFES 
FATA Governance Project 
(2018-2022) US$5,420,310 
(DFID: $5,240,000) 
Build capacity for effective agency/district level governance, 
provide technical assistance to policy-making at federal, 
provincial & agency level. (FATA) 
UNDP 
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Technical assistance to ECP, Electoral laws and procedures 
strengthened, Improved engagement of citizens, particularly 
women and youth, in electoral processes. (KP and Punjab). 
UNDP  
FATA Transition & Recovery 
(2015-2021) US$25,097,291 
(DFID: $1,585,000) 
Support government in contributing to economic, social and 
political stability in FATA (FATA). 
UNDP 




Strengthened capacity of courts, increased access to justice, 
improved police services, legal aid & representation 
mechanism for men, women and other vulnerable groups in 
KP. (KP) 
UNDP 
Source: Authors’ own based on FCDO 2020
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The first programme under consideration is the first phase of AAWAZ (2012-18), which 
was a demand-side intervention with a budget of £39.1 million implemented in the 
provinces of KP and Punjab. Its stated objective was to help build a more stable, inclusive 
and tolerant democracy in Pakistan with democratic processes that became open, 
inclusive and accountable to citizens. Its empowerment and accountability goals were to 
improve women’s ability to participate safely in politics and in public spaces at federal, 
provincial and local levels, and improve citizens’ and communities’ ability to resolve 
disputes peacefully and make effective demands on government for improved service 
delivery. It also sought to generate and synthesize improved evidence around citizen 
actions to attain these goals.  
AAWAZ I engaged civil society by using media (television, radio and social media) for 
awareness raising, establishing Aagahi citizens’ centres at the local level to provide 
training and awareness-raising in communities, and setting up elected forums from the 
village to the district and provincial levels. Its implementing partner was the international 
agency DAI with four national NGOs as downstream partners, Sungi, Aurat Foundation, 
South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK) and Strengthening Participatory Organisations 
(SPO). It provided both men and women with human rights training, especially on domestic 
violence, and supported citizens to raise their demands (which benefit women and 
excluded groups) with public officials. It helped women obtain identity cards and register to 
vote, and trained women to become candidates for local elections. 
The programme has been reconfigured for its second phase AAWAZ 2 (2018-22), and 
renamed ‘AAWAZ II: Reducing Exploitation, Promoting Inclusion’. Near its end in 2017, 
AAWAZ 1 began working on issues of exploitative practices such as child labour, bonded 
and forced labour, domestic servitude, early and forced marriage. It conducted awareness 
raising sessions through forums for domestic workers, home based workers, brick kiln 
workers and factory workers, and held discussions with provincial labour departments. 
Reducing exploitation and promoting inclusion was labelled an ‘emerging priority’ in its 
monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) findings for future DFID programming. The 
findings also stated that marginalised groups are exceptionally vulnerable to exploitation 
(DFID 2018a). 
This emphasis on reducing exploitation and promoting inclusion is also part of the UK 
government’s broader political agenda to tackle child labour, bonded labour, early and 
forced marriage, sex trafficking, human trafficking and any forms of exploitative labour. 
AAWAZ 2 has narrowed down this broader agenda to focus on child labour, child and 
forced marriage, social cohesion and tolerance and gender-based violence. These 
thematic areas are part of DFID’s logical framework for the programme. UNICEF, UNFPA 
and UN Women will receive £17.25 million through AAWAZ 2 to work with Pakistani 
government institutions to strengthen their capacity to tackle these issues and the British 
Council (£19.9 million) is its new implementing partner for work with communities at the 
local level. This work is still in the design phase. 
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4.2 Consolidating democracy in Pakistan 
The second programme in the paired comparison is Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan 
(CDIP), which began in 2016 with a £31.5 million budget for three years and has been 
extended one more year until 2021. CDIP is funded by the UK government’s Conflict, 
Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), jointly managed by the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) and DFID staff seconded to the fund. It is implemented by UNDP and DAI. It 
was conceived as a both a demand and supply-side programme, with the objective to help 
build a democratic system in which government institutions became more capable, 
parliament more accountable and state more responsive to needs and aspirations of the 
people. Its empowerment and accountability goals are to improve transparency and 
inclusiveness in election management and oversight, parliamentary processes, and 
political parties. It seeks to expand the democratic space with improved policy dialogue, 
political debate and public discourse.  
CDIP was designed to ensure that its demand-side work on creating and strengthening 
citizen’s voices was reflected in its supply-side initiatives with government, political 
institutions and politicians by facilitating dialogues, debates, media engagement and other 
opportunities for citizen engagement (interview N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020, Karachi, Komal 
Qidwai). It seeks improved engagement and participation of socially excluded groups, 
including women, youth, minorities, and disabilities. The programme has engaged civil 
society organisations, held social media campaigns, seminars, and trainings. Its gender 
engagement has raised awareness about women’s issues, including domestic violence, 
legal entitlements, and child marriage. It has a strong political participation component, 
aiming to increase women’s voter turnout through training implemented within the 
AAWAZ’s Aagahi centres, increase women’s inclusion in political party decision-making 
and engagement in democratic processes to demand accountability and express voice, 
and provide training to women in electoral processes. The programme has supported, with 
some success, a series of legislative reforms to enhance and protect the rights of women 
and minorities. 
CDIP’s goal to increase the inclusion of women in democratic processes and enhance 
their voices for empowerment and accountability overlaps with some of those of AAWAZ I. 
Its use of the same implementing agency (DAI) and the Aagahi citizen centres established 
under AAWAZ make it a powerful empirical example of a donor agency’s effort to establish 
synergy within its programmes and ensure efficient use of its resources.  
The rapidly evolving social and political context frames the potential and manner in which 
marginalised communities can develop into active empowered citizens in Pakistan. These 
research findings will be useful to FCDO as it considers future democracy programming 
and takes AAWAZ into a second phase, for which the demand-side interventions were still 
being designed at the time of this research.  
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We used a mixed-methods approach to this research, drawing on elements of institutional 
ethnography and subnational comparative approaches to select our field sites and 
research tools. Institutional ethnography aims to understand social organisation and how it 
is shaped by underlying power relations, to distinguish what actually occurs on the ground 
as opposed to what is supposed to happen. We used this understanding to analyse how 
programme implementation strategies and actions were informed by, and deviated from, 
programme design. Some practical data collection methods commonly used in line with 
this approach are interviews, textual analysis, and participant observation (Decruz-Young 
and Anderson 2019). 
The subnational comparative approach was useful for selecting field sites for data 
collection, as it argues against assuming nation-state homogeneity. It posits that 
subnational sites are an important unit of analysis when looking at political change. We 
selected two subnational field sites with varying social and political environments to 
compare how programmes operated differently in each. 
Our literature review examined the business cases, logical frameworks, theories of 
change, annual project reviews, and programme completion reports. Other documents of 
interest were research and policy publications, research reports and training materials. 
Due to the highly sensitive context in which FCDO and other donor organisations operate 
in Pakistan, only those documents in the public domain may be quoted. 
Since AAWAZ’s first phase was completed at the time of our fieldwork, it was not possible 
to observe ongoing activities. Most of CDIP’s programme activities were complete after the 
2018 elections, however, the women’s voter registration campaign work using resources 
from AAWAZ remained ongoing. Fieldwork took place in three locations:  
1. Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, where the head offices of FCDO, DAI and the British 
Council, and national NGO partners are located;  
2. Multan city and one rural site in Multan district, Punjab province; 
3. D.I. Khan city and one rural site in D.I. Khan district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. 
Our field research tools were primarily key informant interviews and focus group 
discussions. We supplemented them with informal interviews and interactions, and 
participant observation during a CDIP programme review meeting with managers from all 
districts. In each district field site we interviewed district programme staff, members of 
citizens groups established under AAWAZ 1, and appointed government officials – district 
election commissioners and officials of the National Database and Registration Authority 
(NADRA) – who interacted with both programmes. In Islamabad we interviewed senior 
DFID staff responsible for the programmes, previous team leaders from DAI responsible 
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for CDIP and AAWAZ, and the new team leader for AAWAZ 2 affiliated with the new 
implementing partner the British Council. AAWAZ 1 was implemented in partnership with 
four national NGOs, we conducted interviews with senior staff from two of these. 
CDIP and AAWAZ were structured differently, but both were implemented through DAI in 
Islamabad. Some AAWAZ programme staff and resource people were used by the CDIP 
voter registration campaign at the district and local level, thus interviews with these 
individuals are classified under both programmes in Annex 2. Government officials 
interviewed from the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and NADRA also worked 
with both programmes at the district levels.  
 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 549 





6. Sub-national comparison 
We selected two districts, Multan and Dera Ismail (D.I.) Khan (Table 6.1) from two different 
provinces to allow for sub-national comparison of the programme interaction effects. There 
were several differences in the socio-cultural and political context of the two districts. 
Interfaith conflict is more pervasive in Multan than in D.I. Khan, whereas the latter district 
has seen greater conflict related to the rise of militancy and a more highly patriarchal 
cultural context (interview Z. Noel, 6 December 2019, Islamabad, Ayesha Khan). 
Table 6.1 Characteristics of districts paired for 
comparison 
Province Punjab Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
District Multan  D.I. Khan 
Population 4.75 million4 1.63 million5 
Language Seraiki Seraiki (& Pashto) 
HDI Rank 0.7186 0.496 
Features of 
Conflict  
Local extremist/militant groups, 
inter-faith & sectarian 
Taliban-led militancy & terrorist 
attacks, sectarian  
Local 
Government 
Last elections 2015, currently 
inactive 
Last elections 2015, currently 
inactive 
Source: Authors’ own 
Multan district is in southern Punjab, the economically weaker belt of Pakistan’s most 
prosperous and populated province bordering the province of Sindh. Its population of 
mainly Seraiki-speakers, have an expressed interest in forming their own province. 
Southern Punjab is characterised by low income levels, weak asset bases, poor 
infrastructure, and weak service delivery, such as health and education (Mehboob 2011). 
The area has not come under direct control of militant groups nor seen direct army action, 
yet a number of extremist religious organisations are based here. The growth of religious 
seminaries, madrassas, attracting impoverished students became a cause for growing 
concern after it emerged the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks were carried out by the banned 
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba using local youth. Since then, security and intelligence agencies have 
had a strong presence in the district and civil society organisations experience high levels 
of surveillance in the name of national security and counter terrorism. It is more difficult for 
donor programmes to operate in South Punjab than in KP, because many activities require 
 
4  Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2017).  
5  Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2017). 
6  UNDP (2017). 
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No Objection Certificates (NOCs) from the government (interview M. Mughal, 19 
December 2019, Islamabad, Komal Qidwai). 
Interfaith conflict exists due to discrimination against members of minority religious groups 
present in southern Punjab, such as Christians, Shias, Hindus, and the Ahmadiyya sect 
(who identify as Muslim yet are disallowed to identify as such by the state). AAWAZ’s 
research revealed prejudicial attitudes against religious minorities amongst lawyers in 
Multan (Janjua 2015), and some social pressure on Christians to convert to Islam (Aftab 
and Taj 2015). Cases of sectarian conflict between Shias and Sunnis have also been 
reported (interview AAWAZ Forum Members, 13 January 2020, Multan, Komal Qidwai and 
S. Javed). 
D.I. Khan district, part of southern KP province, borders the former tribal area of Waziristan 
on one side and Punjab province on the other. Its large Seraiki-speaking population 
differentiates it from KP’s mainly Pashto-speaking heartland. This semi-urban district has 
been severely affected by recent years of Taliban-led militancy, but was nonetheless a 
well-performing district under AAWAZ, with many local women involved in forums and 
Aagahi centres working enthusiastically despite great personal risk (interview H. Khalique, 
5 December 2019, Karachi, Ayesha Khan). AAWAZ reported exceptional progress in D.I. 
Khan, particularly for Output 3, which was focused on improved service delivery (DFID 
2014b; DFID 2013b). Frequent bomb blasts and targeted killings, however, have had a 
negative effect on businesses and increased unemployment (Insan Foundation Trust 
2013: 29). Conflict and stricter patriarchal norms make it difficult for donor programmes to 
operate there (interview S. Khan, 17 January 2020, D.I. Khan, Komal Qidwai). 
D.I. Khan is the only district in the province with high rates of sectarian conflict (interview 
M. Shahbaz, 6 February 2020, Karachi (telephone), Komal Qidwai). Possibly due to its 
proximity with FATA regions, D.I. Khan has been more vulnerable to militant attacks on 
Shias as it serves as a passageway for militants to move from the former tribally-governed 
regions to other parts of the country. Local Shias blame ‘Talibanisation’ in the district on 
Saudi Wahhabism exported to Pakistan. This, together with Iran’s interventions to negate 
Saudi influence, has increased sectarian tensions in the district, leading to the 
displacement of numerous Shias who have sold their businesses and land to Afghan 
settlers and migrants from the tribal areas (Janjua and Noel 2015). 
AAWAZ engaged with elected representatives at different levels in D.I. Khan to push for 
improved service delivery and the demands of citizens to be heard. The programme 
worked with local governments when they were active, but did not rely on this engagement 
(interview S. Khan, 17 January 2020). CDIP staff reported that when local government was 
active their programme was still in its nascent stage and focused on the 2018 General 
Elections. Post-elections, they would have engaged with local government because their 
strategy then shifted to broader awareness-raising, voter education and connecting 
citizens to representatives through an online voter portal (interview N. T. Ali, 4 February 
2020), but, as in Punjab, local government is currently inactive in KP. 
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7. Programme design and political 
analysis 
 
This section examines the analysis and approaches between CDIP and AAWAZ in design, 
implementation, and monitoring of empowerment and accountability outcomes in the 
Pakistan context. We ask to what extent DFID used conflict and vulnerability analysis 
and/or social and political analysis in the FCVAS context to inform programme design and 
implementation approaches, and identify and address drivers of accountability and which 
social and political actors to engage with. We found both AAWAZ and CDIP were born out 
of a political economy analysis (PEA) of Pakistan’s context. AAWAZ was an ambitious 
programme designed ‘to strengthen the social compact between citizen and state’ (DFID 
2011: 5) by acting as a ‘backbone of support’ to DFID Pakistan, through building the 
demand side for its education, health, and border area programmes, and synergising with 
its electoral programmes (DFID 2011). CDIP was designed to consolidate both the UK 
government’s support for strengthening democratic processes, and engaging with both 
demand and supply-side actors. 
AAWAZ and CDIP’s desired impact and outcomes overlap. AAWAZ used PEA at a macro 
and micro-level during its inception phase, based on which it recommended that civil 
society organisations be supported to strengthen their linkages with relevant stakeholders; 
advocacy and outreach programming be developed to influence policies; and new 
leadership be encouraged to support AAWAZ goals (DFID 2013a). CDIP took the 
approach one step further by piloting a live PEA as a case study of ‘thinking and working 
politically’ and to create adaptive and flexible programme interventions, which proved 
effective to helping the programme team manage the political dynamics on the ground 
(DFID 2018c). 
AAWAZ’s rationale was grounded in DFID’s previous programming of electoral support 
and complemented other donors’ on-going work in the area of gender empowerment. The 
business case for AAWAZ argued UK support was needed to help Pakistan become ‘a 
stable, inclusive and tolerant democracy’ (DFID 2011: 5). The programme intended to 
remedy the social exclusion of Pakistanis from politics and governance, which DFID 
viewed as a threat to Pakistan’s stability. This social exclusion gulf is exacerbated by a 
lack of citizens’ trust in the government due to ‘its inability to protect them from violence 
and militancy, and to deliver basic services’ (DFID 2011: 5). The business case argued 
that social, ethnic and religious divisions fuel intolerance, making minorities and women 
more vulnerable and contributing to greater violence and lawlessness. Thus, AAWAZ 
intended to ‘build the social compact between citizen and state and lead to a fairer 
allocation of resources’ (DFID 2011: 5), although such an ambitious agenda of reform was 
not articulated in later programme documents. 
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AAWAZ specifically targeted districts of KP and Punjab ‘prone to local level disputes and 
disagreements’, to enable the safe participation of excluded groups in local, provincial and 
federal governance structures, enhance peaceful dispute resolution and enable 
communities to work together to address their service delivery and other local issues. It 
aimed to complement and build on work done by major development and advocacy NGOs 
in implementing donor-funded community empowerment and gender programmes, as well 
as DFID’s own supply-side programming, specifically the Subnational Governance 
programme (SNG 1), and health and education programmes. 
The AAWAZ design proposed synergising with DFID’s existing electoral programming, 
including the Supporting Transparency, Accountability and Electoral Processes in Pakistan 
(STAEP) programme, which ran from 2011-2014 as a demand-side support to citizens’ 
electoral participation, with one focus being increased female participation in the 2013 
elections. STAEP itself complemented demand-side support to the Election Commission of 
Pakistan (ECP) under DFID’s Support to Electoral Reforms in Pakistan (SERP) 
programme (DFID 2014a). An evaluation of STAEP and SERP noted that social exclusion 
needed to be more explicitly incorporated in the design of future election support 
programmes (Gazdar and Balagamwala 2014). The AAWAZ design anticipated and 
partially met this overall recommendation before the STAEP and SERP evaluations were 
complete. 
AAWAZ’s revised problem analysis, which served as a preamble to modifications in its 
theory of change argued that in Pakistan ‘elite capture and control of resources has led to 
weak governance processes in all spheres’ (DAI 2015: 3) preventing the state from 
meeting the development and security needs of its citizens, in turn has deepening social 
and political divisions. The analysis held that empowering women and excluded groups 
was critical to strengthening democracy and holding the state accountable, requiring 
interventions beyond those focusing exclusively on supply-side governance (DAI 2015: 3). 
This demand-side, citizen’s empowerment approach, empowering women and socially 
vulnerable groups to become equal citizens of the state, reflected UK government priorities 
in FCVAS contexts. The DFID policy for building peaceful states and societies outlines an 
integrated framework to: (1) address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and 
build conflict resolution mechanisms; (2) support inclusive political settlements and 
processes; (3) develop core state functions; and (4) respond to public expectations (DFID 
2010: 6). AAWAZ remained within this framework but focused on addressing root causes 
of conflict and inequalities and creating an inclusive political environment. Its strategy was 
to set up parallel citizens’ forums to improve women’s political participation and conflict 
resolution within communities, reduce gender-based violence, and enable citizens to 
demand better service delivery (DFID 2013a). The programme used power analysis within 
the forums to identify types and triggers of conflicts in communities and explore ways to 
pre-empt these conflicts (DFID 2016). 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 549 






CDIP’s business case envisioned an opportunity to deepen democratic culture and 
practice before the 2018 election cycle to further the UK’s strategic objective of seeing 
stability in Pakistan. It is funded by the UK government’s Conflict, Stability and Security 
Fund (CSSF). CDIP is intended to complement other programmes administered through 
this fund, including the Rule of Law, FATA stabilisation and integration projects. Its view of 
the political context draws attention to certain weaknesses in the democratic transition. It 
was designed to take a holistic strengthening approach to democratisation in Pakistan, 
focusing on improving the quality of political governance institutions, increasing their 
accountability along with citizen inclusion through bridging the gaps that separate the 
supply and demand side of previous programming and engaging civil society groups more 
directly with government and politicians to support democratic processes and legislation 
(Jilani 2020). 
CDIP came on board towards the end of AWAAZ’s first phase. The interaction effects 
between the two programmes’ demand-side work was a deliberate part of the ‘transition 
phase’ between AWAAZ’s first and second phases, and integral to the success of CDIP 
given its own implementation time-frame (DFID 2016). However, some programme 
implementers on the ground refer to CDIP as primarily a supply-side programme whose 
main focus became supporting the government and political institutions for the successful 
roll-out of credible and legitimate national elections in 2018. 
7.1 Theories of Change 
Both programmes envisioned similar outcomes and impact with respect to strengthening 
democracy by making it more inclusive (AAWAZ) and more accountable to citizens 
(CDIP). It was Output 4 of CDIP, the expansion of democratic spaces, which overlapped 
most directly with AAWAZ’s Output 1, women better able to participate in politics and 
public spaces. In effect, Output 4 of CDIP was the most demand-side output of the 
programme that worked with civil society to strengthen citizen-state interactions and 
improve the capacity of CSOs to engage with state institutions. It was intended to augment 
the goals of Outputs 1-3, which also supported civil society in its dealings with the ECP, 
parliamentarians and political parties, and further underscore the citizen interaction 
element in CDIP (Jilani 2020). 
The AAWAZ Theory of Change (ToC) underwent one major modification during the 
programme’s duration. After its 2014 review, Output 2 shifted from conflict mediation, i.e. 
an improvement in citizens’ and communities’ ability to resolve disputes peacefully (Figure 
7.1 below), to a conflict pre-emption approach, with concurrent changes in the monitoring 
and evaluation framework and logframe. The programme had initially created peace 
committees in communities for conflict resolution, but soon found that socially excluded or 
marginalised people (including women) came under pressure to use informal dispute 
resolution mechanisms to settle disputes, which would reinforce patriarchal norms unless 
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arbitrators were sufficiently sensitised. The review found the programme could not provide 
sufficient training on conflict resolution and recommended a shift towards conflict 
prevention (DFID 2015). AAWAZ therefore turned its focus to two sources of conflict: inter-
faith and sectarian conflicts, and domestic violence (DAI 2015). 
This change to conflict pre-emption was recorded successfully in AAWAZ’s programme 
documentation, and indicators to measure the impact of this output were changed 
accordingly (DFID 2018a) (see Table 7.1 below). Programme leads communicated the 
change effectively to programme staff at national, district and Aagahi centre (local) levels, 
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Table 7.1 Changes in AAWAZ output 2 indicators 
Indicators 2013-2014a 2015b 2016 onwardsc 










Number of women and 
men informed about 
support mechanisms 
and provided with 
awareness on non-
violent communication 
and valuing diversity. 
Number of women and 
men informed about 
support mechanisms 
and provided with 
awareness on non-
violent communication 
and valuing diversity.  




AAWAZ Forums and 
local level peace 
building initiatives. 
Number of women, men 
and socially excluded 
citizens positively 
impacted by AAWAZ 
forum 
interventions/members' 
actions to protect them 
from discrimination, 
harmful cultural 
practices & violence 
(sectarian, gender, 
religious, etc. 
a)  Number of women, 
men and socially 
excluded citizens 
positively impacted by 
AAWAZ forum 
interventions/ members' 
actions to protect them 
from discrimination, 
harmful cultural 
practices & violence 
(sectarian, inter-faith, 
gender based, etc.) 
b) Qualitative 





mechanisms to be 
credible and effective.  
3. Percentage of people 
in programme districts 
who consider AAWAZ 
community cohesion 
mechanisms to be 
credible and effective.  
Number of women and 
excluded group 
members participating in 
AAWAZ Forums' local 
level peace building 
initiatives (data 
disaggregated by 
gender and religion).  
Number of women and 
excluded group 
members participating 
in AAWAZ Forums’ 
local level peace 
building initiatives (data 
disaggregated by 
gender and religion).  
Sources: Authors’ own based on a. (DFID 2013b, 2014b) b. (DFID 2015) c. (DFID 2016, 2017b)  
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Stable, inclusive and tolerant democracy in Pakistan 
Impact 
Democratic process in Pakistan are more open, inclusive, and accountable to citizens 
Women better able to 
participate safely in politics and 
public spaces at federal, 
provincial, local levels in KP 
and Punjab 
Citizens and communities better 
able to resolve disputes 
peacefully, and work together for 
common solutions in KP & Punjab 
Women and other excluded 
groups better able to 
demand improved delivery 
of services in KP & Punjab 
Outcome 
Outputs 
Improved evidence generated, 
synthesised and communicated/ 
championed to political 
leaders/elites in KP & Punjab 
Advocating for 
Legislation/Policy – 
Advocacy with key 
policymakers, assistance in 
drafting laws, conducting 
dialogues and raising 
demands for new laws from 
grassroots to provincial and 
national levels to safeguard 
the rights of women and 
socially excluded groups 
will create and enabling 
environment for women 
and socially excluded 
groups to participate in 
public spaces/politics and 
occupy leadership 
positions. 
Creating Coalitions for Action and Inclusion – 
Working directly and intensively with a critical mass 
of women and men, through forums and coalitions, 
(1) raising awareness on root causes and key 
issues of exclusion and conflict, (2) providing 
knowledge on rights, government processes for 
delivering basic social services and advocacy tools 
for raising demands and (3) facilitating their access 
to government officers and political representatives 
will create communities of practice at the local level 
and amplify the voices of women and socially 
excluded groups in and across districts to the 
national level. These coalitions will drive change by 
challenge discriminatory norms, and harmful 
practices, and foster inclusion at the individual, 
household, community and national levels, with a 
special focus on influencing the State and holding it 
accountable. 
Raising awareness on 
women’s rights and the rights 
of socially excluded groups and 
build their skills to challenge 
discriminatory social norms, 
attitudes and practices; and 
information dissemination to 
citizens on laws, government 
processes and procedures for 
delivery of services, will lead to 
positive changes in 
perceptions, attitudes and 
practices. These changes will 
increase women and socially 
excluded citizens’ confidence, 
space to access rights and 
capacity to take action for 
equality. 
Generating 






decision makers to 
undertake the policy 
reform required to 
safeguard the rights 





equal citizens of the 
State. 




Exclusion on the basis of gender, religion, class and caste manifested in unequal power relations, especially between men and women, leads to lack 
of voice, choice and control for women and socially excluded groups from household to the national level, in public and private spaces increasing 
vulnerability to violence and limiting their freedoms and opportunities as full and equal citizens of Pakistan. 
Source: DFID 2018 
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Lack of capacity of 
parliamentarians 
Consolidating democracy in Pakistan for sustainable stability and development 
in Pakistan 
Impact 
A democratic system in which government institutions are more capable, 
parliament is more accountable and the state institutions are more responsive 















































processes are more 
inclusive; where 
parliamentarians are 
more effective in 
holding government 
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Lack of public trust on 
ECP 
Lack of focus on evidence 
based politics 
Weak structure of political 
parties 

































Source: Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan (CDIP) Programme 
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Both the AAWAZ and CDIP programme theories of change (ToC) identify 
problems in political culture which need to be addressed. The CDIP ToC 
identifies problem areas mainly in terms of the capacity of formal political 
institutions, such as the ECP, parliament and political parties. Public and civil 
society are brought into the ToC in relation to lack of public trust in government 
institutions and lack of inclusion, with gender as one cross-cutting theme. The 
AAWAZ ToC identifies an authoritarian and exclusionary political culture that 
blocks citizens’ ‘participation and voice in policies, laws and decisions’ as a 
problem area, although this is embedded in a deeper analysis of individual, 
social and political inequalities the programme has sought to address. 
7.2 The role of consortium partners 
DAI implemented AAWAZ 1 by working with consortium partners that have been 
among the leading advocacy and development NGOs operating in Pakistan 
since the 1980s. All had an extensive track record of organising communities to 
advocate with government for increased citizen empowerment and for state 
accountability. The values and experience of these partners enabled AAWAZ’s 
community outreach and informed the adaptive programme design. These 
partners are introduced briefly below. 
Aurat Foundation (AF) was established in 1986 by Pakistan women’s movement 
leaders to work on women’s political and economic empowerment, ending 
violence against women, ensuring compliance with international commitments, 
increasing women’s access to justice and legal rights, and social mobilisation of 
communities for rights-based activism and advocacy. It has played a leading role 
in increasing women’s political participation and achieving recent breakthroughs 
in progressive law-making. Its networks of citizen groups in 128 districts across 
the country have been in place since the 1990s (Aurat Foundation 2020). 
Drawing on its extensive work on women’s political participation, AF led Output 1 
under AAWAZ. 
South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK) was formed in 1987 by a group of 
intellectuals and social activists to empower marginalised groups to demand and 
advocate for their rights. It has built the capacity of over 500 local CSOs and 
CBOs in a range of development activities, many of which organisations are still 
operational in the field. It also carries out programmes on voter education and 
has conducted candidates’ facilitation and election monitoring. In recent years, it 
has increased its engagement with peasants, workers, women, religious 
minorities and political workers (SAP-PK 2020). SAP-PK led Output 2, the 
conflict resolution work under AAWAZ. 
Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO) and Sungi Development 
Foundation were the technical leads on social mobilisation, Output 3 of the 
programme. SPO began in 1985 as the Small Projects Technical Support Office 
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funded by Canadian Aid for their Social Sector Funds Project and grew into an 
autonomous organisation, directly carrying out capacity building of community-
based organisations (CBOs) and expanding its offices across the country. It also 
developed specialised programmes for female literacy and village level 
education in Balochistan and KP (Naqeeb 2006). 
Sungi began its work in 1989 to mobilise citizens to advocate for effective 
development policies related to health, education and the environment. Sungi 
worked on relief and rehabilitation efforts for the 1992 floods in the KP region, 
which increased its contact with communities and coordination with local 
activists. Its core strategy is to work through village organisations to mobilise and 
empower communities for rights based advocacy and to work on sustainable 
livelihoods, disaster management, and social development. Sungi focused on 
three aspects of social mobilisation under the programme, which were capacity 
enhancement, building human resources, and connecting citizens as rights’ 
holders to the state. Sungi includes women in all its interventions, and has run a 
political education programme for women (Sungi Development Foundation 
2020).  
All four consortium partners were responsible for implementing the three main 
outputs of the programme in the field (DFID 2018a). Each organisation led one 
output through producing its training material and recommending implementation 
strategies. All training material was produced after consultation between the 
partners, and standardised across all districts. AF, SAP-PK, and SPO each 
operated in 13 districts across KP and Punjab, and Sungi operated in 6 districts 
in KP (interview M. Mughal, 19 December 2019). Many AAWAZ District 
Managers who were previously affiliated with the four consortium partners later 
became CDIP Cluster Coordinators and affiliated with DAI (CDIP Cluster 
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8. Empowerment and accountability 
We now turn to the question of how the donor’s analysis and practice relate 
empowerment with accountability, implicitly or explicitly. We found that the two 
DFID programmes were consistent in their understanding and articulation of 
these concepts. This synergy was enhanced through a shared emphasis on 
gender empowerment to achieve programme goals, and a shared use of DAI as 
an implementing partner which in turn partnered with downstream NGOs with a 
history of working towards the same vision of a participatory citizen-state 
compact. The programmes also used the same CAR framework to measure 
voice and accountability.  
AAWAZ and CDIP’s understanding of gender empowerment were broadly 
aligned. Harris Khalique (interview H. Khalique, 5 December 2019), who served 
as DAI’s AAWAZ Team Leader, understood it as essentially a gender 
programme, on the assumption that women in Pakistan experience a fragile and 
hostile environment everywhere. Other staff say its vision of change was to 
assist communities to consolidate their demands and push them to take action, 
and it did so through providing training to women on democracy through mock 
political processes, elected women’s assemblies, and providing them exposure 
to parliamentarians (interview N. Khalid, 17 January 2020, Karachi, Ayesha 
Khan; interview M. Shahbaz, 6 February 2020). The conflict-related work 
became directed towards raising awareness about violence against women and 
preventing domestic violence, which further reinforced the gender identity of the 
programme. CDIP’s view of gender empowerment was framed by its focus on 
expanded democratic space, and within that women’s participation. Its Output 4 
sought to mobilise individuals through greater engagement, such as policy 
dialogues, debates and political inclusion (interview N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020). 
In further consonance with AAWAZ’s understanding of empowerment, social 
inclusion was a key component of the CDIP campaign (interview Z. Noel, 6 
December 2019). It used women celebrities for its media campaign to encourage 
women to vote and formed pre-election coalitions of CSOs to hold seminars and 
events to mobilise women for political participation (interview N. T. Ali, 4 
February 2020). 
AAWAZ and CDIP both used DFID’s framework for measuring voice and 
accountability, known as CAR, which focuses on three overlapping elements of 
governance. These are: (1) Capability, which refers to the ability of leaders and 
government to perform effectively and provide stability and growth. (2) 
Accountability, which refers to the ability of citizens, civil society and the private 
sector to hold public sector and government accountable and ensure 
transparency with a free media and open electoral process. (3) Responsiveness 
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of state institutions and policies to the rights of citizens, including their access to 
public services and policies to reduce inequalities (Holland et al. 2009). 
All the AAWAZ goals (see Figure 7.1) are related to the empowerment of women 
and the improved accountability of political leaders and government to women, 
and other excluded groups, to service delivery and local demands. According to 
the AAWAZ Deputy Team Leader, the adaptive programming approach allowed 
them to incorporate new language into the programme as it evolved, such as 
‘deepening the change’ and enhancing its concept of empowerment to include 
developing women ‘change-makers’. The DAI programme structure incorporated 
feedback from the field level and adapted programme strategies accordingly.  
CDIP and AAWAZ targeted similarly marginalised groups. AAWAZ officially 
sought to build the capacity of women, youth and excluded groups, i.e. 
constitutionally-defined religious minorities, third-gender persons, people with 
disabilities, landless and ethno-linguistic minorities (DFID 2017a). CDIP targeted 
women, people with disabilities, transgender people and nomads specifically 
(DFID 2018c) through increasing their political participation as voters and 
decision-makers in political parties, while AAWAZ actually built an apparatus of 
participation and representation. 
This apparatus was a network of forums (village councils, district women’s 
assemblies and provincial forums), youth circles of influence, open courts (‘khuli 
katcheries’), and Aagahi centres. The Aagahi centres, conceptualised as 
women-friendly spaces and staffed by a local woman resource person (RP) in 
each district, provided training on human rights, domestic violence awareness, 
conflict pre-emption and peace building. Women reported the centres as being a 
cathartic space for them. 
Citizens from the village councils elected women to the district assemblies, who 
in turn elected their representatives to the AAWAZ Provincial Forum. The open 
courts brought citizens, politicians and government officials together to hear local 
complaints, many of which were resolved through this mechanism. All AAWAZ 
forums had at least 50 per cent female participation. 
Each level of this apparatus was in effect a means to off-set patronage politics 
and elite capture at the district level by including representation in AAWAZ 
forums from previously excluded groups and ensuring that citizen’s demands 
were heard. By creating new spaces for engagement and facilitating citizen’s 
encounters with government officials (ombudsmen, courts, anti-corruption 
departments, etc.) and media representatives, the programme bypassed 
significant barriers to empowerment and accountability at the local level (AAWAZ 
District Forum Members Focus Group Discussion, 16 January 2020, D.I. Khan, 
facilitated by S. Javed). Some AAWAZ activity participants were financially 
rewarded for their time, which had potential implications for the ‘endogenous’ 
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nature of their social and political action (Esser 2019), although the programme 
did break state monopoly of ‘official executive oversight’ at multiple governance 
levels (DFID 2018a: 23). 
AAWAZ forum members’ interactions with elected and non-elected government 
officials took place through the khuli katcheris, or open forums in which 
government officials were invited to respond to citizen’s demands in person. The 
AAWAZ District Coordination Committees – which included programme 
managers from implementing partners and were headed by the Deputy 
Commissioner of each district – were helpful in organising these open forums 
and maintaining links with district government officials.  
Social inclusion was a key component of AAWAZ (interview Z. Noel, 6 
December 2019). The programme began by training participants within its 
forums. These trained participants then made village health plans and village 
education plans to improve service delivery. The plans were shared with 
government health and education departments to influence the government’s 
own development plans for villages and districts (interview M. Mughal, 19 
December 2019).  




Source: Authors own based on information from AAWAZ 
AAWAZ’s NGO partners’ understanding of empowerment and accountability and 
citizen mobilisation was aligned with that of CDIP’s Tabeer programme and 
DFID. They saw the programme as connecting citizens to networks and forums 
to enable social and political action to resolve their issues. Still, district level 
AAWAZ staff found local citizen understandings of empowerment and 
accountability, and social and political action are shaped by their cultural, social 
and political context and do differ from mobilisers’ conceptions. When the 
AAWAZ team went into communities, they found varied levels of awareness and 
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disempowerment. As a result, they identified different target communities within 
local settings, using mapping to identify needs, priorities and areas of conflict 
(CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019). DFID 
used Aurat Foundation’s knowledge to identify community needs and design the 
gender training material for Aagahi centres (interview M. Mughal, 19 December 
2019). 
AAWAZ modelled parallel democratic processes. People from target 
communities selected representatives for the AAWAZ Village Forum, a mixed 
group of men, women, and other marginalised people, which in turn elected 
representatives for the union council (UC) and district level forums. These 
various forums held meetings to identify community problems and propose 
solutions (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 
2019). These AAWAZ forums mobilised villagers towards collective action to 
hold their local government councillors and government officials accountable. 
Problems that could not be solved at the village and UC levels were brought to 
district forum members who would connect people to the relevant government 
departments, local government representatives, or local politicians (AAWAZ 
District Forum Members Focus Group Discussion, 16 January 2020). 
Underpinning this work was the belief that when government officials see citizens 
actively participating, they cannot refuse to engage with them (interview S. U. 
Khan, 17 January 2020, D.I. Khan, Komal Qidwai and S. Javed). 
The programme soon initiated a District Women’s Assembly to compensate for 
male dominance in these forums. The assemblies trained women in political and 
legislative processes, replicating the work of a legislative assembly. Some of the 
women elected to the District Women’s Assembly went on to contest local 
elections (AAWAZ District Forum Members Focus Group Discussion, 16 January 
2020).  
The local female resource person at each Aagahi Centre became a key 
community mobiliser and contact for facilitating local demands. Before joining 
AAWAZ, these RPs often lacked skills and confidence, but through the 
programme learned to engage with communities and government (CDIP Cluster 
Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019). In Multan, where 
NGOs are distrusted, RPs helped to build trust and sensitise locals to gender 
issues (interview S. U. Khan, 17 January 2020). In D.I. Khan, RPs assisted 
women to cast their votes for the first time, and mobilised women through their 
own networks to engage in programme activities (AAWAZ Aagahi Centre 
Resource Persons Focus Group Discussion, 16 January 2020, D.I. Khan, 
facilitated by Komal Qidwai). RPs assisted locals in meeting up across religious, 
gender and class divides, often for the first time, sensitising and training them on 
political and social issues (AAWAZ Aagahi Centre Resource Persons Focus 
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Group Discussion, 13 January 2020, Multan, facilitated by Ayesha Khan; 
AAWAZ District Forum Members Focus Group Discussion, 16 January 2020). 
All the cluster coordinators from the Tabeer programme’s voter registration 
campaign were previously affiliated with the four NGO consortium partners in 
AAWAZ I. Many Aagahi Centre RPs later joined the Tabeer campaign as social 
mobilisers. Supervised by district managers, they would go into communities and 
visit women in their homes to encourage and often convince them to have 
Computerised National Identity Cards (CNICs), a prerequisite for voting. These 
social mobilisers even made announcements in local mosques to inform people 
about the campaign. Once they had lists of identified individuals for CNIC 
registration, they would ask NADRA for Mobile Registration Vans (MRVs) to 
undertake the registrations in the community, or to make arrangements to 
transport people to NADRA’s National Resource Centres (NRCs). NADRA 
provides the MRV service for those villages that do not have an NRC within a 10 
kilometre vicinity. The vans are staffed and equipped to process CNIC requests, 
with computers for data entry and fingerprint scanners. MRVs often have only 
male staff members, to which many men in conservative target communities 
objected. Social mobilisers, both men and women, therefore engaged with 
community and village elders and male family members of the women to 
sensitise them and ensure their cooperation. The social mobilisers continued to 
follow up with NADRA on the CNICs of identified individuals, and assisted 
people, particularly transgender and disabled individuals, in meeting NADRA’s 
documentation requirements.  
Figure 8.2 CDIP organogram 
 
Source: Authors’ own based on information from CDIP 
Initially CDIP found it difficult to mobilise members of the public for its voter 
registration campaign, so it did not make avoiding elite capture a priority. If local 
influentials actively participated they were encouraged to continue, so the 
programme could establish ‘buy in’ within the community. Subsequently the 
programme slowly included marginalised groups, and trained them in avoiding 
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hijacking of the political space by influential elites. Programme officers say they 
made an effort not to favour participants based on their own personal 
connections, families and castes (Interview S. Khan, 17 January 2020). 
Tabeer’s district coordinators’ understanding of women’s empowerment 
suggests it was influenced by AAWAZ, possibly through design or the previous 
experiences many of the coordinators had of working with the programme. The 
coordinators note that the programme seeks to empower women to analyse and 
resolve issues themselves. Tabeer sought to create awareness in women and 
mobilise them to take action through helping them to get identity cards and 
register to vote (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 
December 2019). 
There were significant external constraints to the empowerment and 
accountability goals of both AAWAZ and CDIP. AAWAZ programme respondents 
in Multan and D.I. Khan districts regretted that the broader context did not 
develop further to support the programme’s work. For the first three years of 
AAWAZ, local government, consisting of the three tiers of union council, district, 
and tehsil elected bodies, in both KP and Punjab were inactive due to delays in 
elections, meaning the programme forums served as alternative spaces for 
citizens to voice their demands and interact with local politicians and non-elected 
government officials. While national elections took place in 2018, local 
government elections were delayed (I. A. Khan 2019; Warraich 2019). 
Respondents noted that the high rate of turnover of government officials was 
disruptive to the relationship and trust-building work of the programme (AAWAZ 
District Forum Members Focus Group Discussion, 16 January 2020; interview S. 
U. Khan, 17 January 2020). 
Fieldwork revealed the interface between CDIP and AAWAZ may have helped to 
undercut some of these constraints and enable the empowerment and 
accountability agenda of AAWAZ to continue even after the end of its first phase. 
The boxes highlighted in green in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 above indicate where the 
programmes overlapped through using common human resources. The blue 
boxes indicate which programme structures CDIP used formally for its women 
voter registration campaigns.  
CDIP’s Tabeer programme came on board after AAWAZ was underway but the 
interface between the two programmes through Tabeer’s use of the AAWAZ 
structure for its demand-side work was facilitated through having a common 
implementing agency. Interview respondents believe that the idea for using 
Aagahi centres for Tabeer’s voter registration emerged as part of the adaptive 
programming and value for money approach which the programme had from the 
start, enabling it to take this strategic decision. Using AAWAZ partner grantee 
organisations and partner grantee organisations funded through an Innovation 
and Research Fund (IRF) which it set up, provided Tabeer with an advantage 
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over other voter registration efforts in the run-up to the 2018 elections (interview 
N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020). 
Interviews suggest that DAI intended to use Aagahi centres to implement 
Tabeer, and any initial reluctance from programme staff was overcome through 
DFID which was interested in using the infrastructure built up through AAWAZ 
(interview N. Khalid, 17 January 2020). Although CDIP as a programme did not 
follow the consortium model, it did leverage the strength of this model through its 
interaction with AAWAZ. 
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9. Interaction effects as adaptive 
programming 
This section addresses the question of how different donor programmes interact 
with one another with respect to their roles in enabling empowerment and 
accountability to explore areas of synergy, or possible conflict, in this dynamic. 
We find the interaction effects between AAWAZ and CDIP are a powerful 
example of adaptive programming in a fragile social and political context. The 
common implementing partner DAI worked closely with DFID and CSSF 
colleagues to adapt programming strategies on the ground, and strong 
communication channels with community and NGO partnerships informed this 
process. When DAI started to implement Tabeer, after AAWAZ was well 
underway, it was ideally positioned to build on these existing partnerships to 
meet its goals.  
The DAI leadership worked closely with DFID colleagues,7 engaging in weekly or 
fortnightly meetings. This enabled adaptive programming and creative 
strategising during the roll-out of AAWAZ. As a result of the political economy 
analysis and engagement between the key actors, the biggest evolution in 
AAWAZ programme design and implementation was the change from conflict 
resolution to conflict pre-emption. This was the result of field findings regarding 
the utility of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, such as jirgas or 
public safety commissions. Team leaders concluded that ADR was not working 
and there were inherent risks in setting up tiers similar to jirgas for mediating or 
resolving local conflicts (interview H. Khalique, 5 December 2019). The team 
leader realised if transformational change was envisioned then they needed to 
have conversations within communities about conflict pre-emption and be 
prepared to modify the programme (interview N. Khalid, 17 January 2020). 
Another programme adaptation was required in order to facilitate women’s 
inclusion more effectively. In the programme’s social mobilisation phase in KP, it 
was very difficult to form groups and forums including both men and women, and 
impossible to mobilise women resource people for the Aagahi centres. These 
were at first run exclusively by men, until DAI created additional resource centres 
specifically for women so that the male-run centres could be phased out 
(interview Z. Noel, 6 December 2019). 
One design modification was to reduce the number of citizen’s committees in 
each district, due to constraints on management and accountability. Thus, union 
council forums replaced village forums, and represented ten villages each 
because it proved unwieldy for the programme to manage hundreds of village 
 
7  These included both DFID and FCO staff seconded to CSSF for CDIP. 
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forums (interview M. Mughal, 19 December 2019). Team leaders also removed 
tehsil forums, corresponding to the second tier of local government above union 
councils, and worked on a district level, or third tier, in order to maintain 
programme focus (interview K. Fayyaz, 14 January 2020, Multan, Ayesha Khan). 
DFID and DAI told district staff to adapt to ground realities and that they would 
support them in doing so (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 
19 December 2019). Every AAWAZ Forum offered feedback to the implementing 
consortium partner, who would then set goals for activities and targets 
accordingly, e.g. by focusing on a specific topic for training (interview AAWAZ 
Forum Members, 13 January 2020). There was flexibility in the implementation 
strategy because the cultural and political environment varied between districts 
(interview S. U. Khan, 17 January 2020). In more conservative KP the AAWAZ 
Forums for men and women were initially separate, but in Punjab they were 
mixed. Where it was challenging in KP to mobilise women, female resource 
people worked with male co-facilitators, who were their husbands or brothers 
(CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019). 
CDIP also worked as an adaptive political programme, responsive to new 
opportunities and the current political environment. Programme officers provided 
feedback to their managers who revised the strategy as needed (interview S. 
Khan, 17 January 2020). During the first two pre-election years of the 
programme all activities focused on political inclusion, awareness, electoral 
participation, and mobilising voters, especially women and socially excluded 
groups. This mobilisation involved making people aware of the importance of 
electoral participation. They worked from district to provincial levels, focusing on 
demand creation. CDIP prepared an action plan to raise awareness about local 
government elections, which in the end was not used as the elections did not 
happen (interview N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020). 
CDIP’s Tabeer programme initially engaged directly with civil society 
organisations through setting up an Innovation and Research Fund (IRF) to 
provide them and citizen groups with small grants focusing on Sustainable 
Development Goal 16 to promote peace, justice and strong institutions. After EU 
and Canada’s support to ECP didn’t materialise due to the lack of an 
administrative arrangement and coordination between EU and the Government 
of Pakistan (GoPK), Tabeer, with agreement from DFID, decided to repurpose its 
IRF resources to supplement ECP’s polling staff training to maximise coverage 
across the provinces. The government imposed further regulations on CSOs in 
late 2017, prior to the elections, with implications for Tabeer’s selection of partner 
organisations in favour of those with a history of successfully negotiating 
regulations at various levels of government (DAI 2019: 4). 
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Figure 9.1 Theory of action in AAWAZ and CDIP 
 
Source: Authors’ own based on information from AAWAZ and CDIP 
The timing of the interaction between the two programmes took place when 
AAWAZ was winding down but still active, and CDIP was beginning its voter 
registration work. The interaction built on the advantage of AAWAZ’s citizen 
outreach and mobilisation network, using resource people as social mobilisers 
and cluster coordinators for CDIP. Thus, DAI as common implementing agency 
used the human resources generated through the AAWAZ programme for 
Tabeer.  
Tabeer registered women voters through Aagahi centres, all 450 of which it 
funded for a year after the AAWAZ funding came to an end, and used former 
AAWAZ resource people and staff for its campaign. Using the centres, Tabeer 
reached out to over 100,000 citizens for civic voter education. Before AAWAZ 
fully ended, its forums and Aagahi centres were already being used to help 
women get national identity cards (CNICs) and educate them about the voting 
process (DFID 2018b). Tabeer later engaged resource people from these Aagahi 
centres to work on its subsequent women voter registration and voter education 
campaigns (DFID 2018c). This enhanced both the outcome of these campaigns 
and their value for money since DAI did not need to set up a mid-tier 
administration, using the resource people already in place. The cluster 
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coordinators hired for the campaign also drew from amongst field staff from the 
four main NGO consortium partners in AAWAZ (interview U. Khanzada, 6 
December 2019, Islamabad, Ayesha Khan; interview Z. Noel, 6 December 
2019). 
The ECP’s District Voter Education Committees (DVEC) also facilitated 
capitalising on AAWAZ staff knowledge, as they included many of the same 
government representatives (ECP and NADRA) and civil society representatives 
who were active in AAWAZ forums. In their new role as social mobilisers, Aagahi 
Centre resource people built on their existing social capital and networks to 
manage the risks of community outreach for Tabeer in politically sensitive and 
highly patriarchal locations. 
The result was a higher rate of voter registration than other similar programmes. 
In the six months prior to the 2018 elections, the two main voter registration 
campaigns were the one run by ECP, supported by the UNDP and implemented 
through a NGO called FAFEN (Free and Fair Election Network), and the Tabeer 
programme run through the Aagahi centres. Together they registered 4.3 million 
women, whereas in the previous three years a total of only 4.8 million women 
had been registered (interview D. Nance, 6 December 2019, Islamabad, Ayesha 
Khan; DFID 2018a). Tabeer used Aagahi centres in 45 districts of KP and 
Punjab to help 184,107 women and transgender persons acquire CNICs (DAI 
2019: 13). FAFEN employed a model of subcontracting other NGOs and CSOs 
for its campaign, whereas Tabeer’s use of pre-existing Aagahi centres proved to 
be more efficient and cost effective (interview A. Goraya, 6 December 2020, 
Islamabad, Ayesha Khan). 
After AAWAZ came to an end, DAI absorbed some of its senior managers into 
Tabeer. One programme manager currently heads the women voter registration 
campaign, and other AAWAZ district managers became cluster coordinators for 
the campaign. Civil society members of the AAWAZ village, union council and 
district forums became informal social mobilisers for the campaign. Although 
both programmes operated in KP and Punjab, targeting many of the same 
communities, CDIP had national coverage. 
Relationships with government officials, such as those represented on AAWAZ’s 
District Coordination Committees, were leveraged to gain ECP and NADRA 
support for the voter registration campaign to continue even after the closure of 
the Aagahi centres. AAWAZ staff, such as district managers, and forum 
members joined the government DVECs, which were a key site of CDIP 
engagement with government and citizen representatives. CDIP staff members 
participated in DVEC meetings. However, with the end of both AAWAZ and 
CDIP support to Aagahi centres, a valuable resource and successful community 
engagement model has been lost (interview A. Goraya, 6 December 2020) to the 
detriment of the overall goals of both programmes. 
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10. Monitoring and evaluating 
empowerment and accountability 
This section examines how AAWAZ and CDIP used their monitoring and 
evaluation systems to document and analyse whether and how their 
programmes contributed to empowerment and accountability. DAI’s adaptive 
approach responded to inputs from consortium partners and field staff which led 
to key changes in the design of AAWAZ. Although CDIP did not measure the 
dynamics of change, as AAWAZ did, the indicators used to measure overall 
impact were similar across both programmes. 
AAWAZ initially had a Programme Analysis, Research and Results (PARR) 
framework, which was managed by a local development and research 
organisation. DAI then modified its approach and brought in a Deputy Team 
Leader who became more directly active in Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning 
(MEL) (interview N. Khalid, 17 January 2020). The consortium partners were 
closely engaged in the internal monitoring and submitted quarterly reports to DAI 
(DFID 2011). They monitored the community-based organisations and local 
NGOs with whom they had sub-contracted activities, and any constraints faced 
by these staff were highlighted and considered when strategising (interview S. U. 
Khan, 17 January 2020). This was part of the programme’s adaptive approach.  
The programme operated on the notion that social change is not linear. The 
AAWAZ Deputy Team Leader explained that the work was based on the concept 
of the ‘spiral of change’, from individual level, to household level, to community 
level and further. When programme staff decided to track behavioural change 
more closely after the inception phase, they documented the formation of 
‘women leaders’ and ‘change makers’ through the programme (interview N. 
Khalid, 17 January 2020). Value for money was integrated into AAWAZ in 2015 
forming the basis of a cost benefit analysis of the programme. This led to 
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The AAWAZ 2017 log frame lists key indicators for the overall impact, outcome 
and for each output. The indicators were used to measure how the programme 
contributed to empowerment (particularly for women and marginalised groups) 
and accountability (DFID 2017a). The impact indicators include a number for 
Pakistanis who feel quite or very safe over the course of a year (based on the 
national survey conducted by Gallup on ‘Polling on Crimes, Violence, Terrorism 
and Social Evils’), the voice and accountability score from the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and Pakistan’s Gender Gap rank. The 
overall outcome indicators include the number of laws supporting women or 
excluded groups’ rights on which progress is made, the proportion of men and 
women who report a change in their knowledge, attitude and practices regarding 
the participation of women in political and public spheres and violence against 
women and girls, the percentage of girls, women and excluded groups who 
report a use of and satisfaction with key public services (education, health and 
sanitation), and the number of people supported to have choice and control over 
their own development and to hold decision-makers to account.  
Specific indicators for the four main outputs are listed in Table 10.1 above. They 
measure activities and inputs, as well as the change in targeted individuals, such 
as women active in forums as opposed to only participating, the number of 
people positively impacted by AAWAZ interventions regarding forced marriages 
and domestic violence, and the number of households impacted by improved 
service delivery achieved through the programme. 
The key indicators measuring the overall impact of CDIP are similar to those of 
AAWAZ. They are the democracy index score from the World Democracy Index 
from The Economist Intelligence Unit, the voice and accountability score from the 
WGI and the Global Gender Gap Index (DFID 2018b). The indicators for the 
programme’s four main outputs are listed in Table 10.2, along with a few 
examples of activities measured under those outputs. While AAWAZ’s indicators 
included those measuring changes in behaviour, the CDIP indicators mainly 
measure inputs and activities rather than dynamics of change (DFID 2018c). 
CDIP’s post-April 2018 Annual Review reports that the programme monitors any 
CSOs it engages with via monthly and quarterly progress reports. The third-party 
monitoring of the programme is conducted through Ecorys (research and 
consulting company), Annual Reviews and an independent impact evaluation, 
which was underway at that time (DFID 2018c). The programme’s district level 
staff for the women voter registration campaign participates in monthly review 
meetings held by DAI. The constraints faced by the programme’s social 
mobilisers within the field are discussed during this meeting (CDIP Cluster 
Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019). The Annual Review 
process involves reviewing programme documents, discussions with the 
programme team, and meetings with relevant government actors (DFID 2018c). 
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11. Negotiating shrinking civic space 
We now examine how the programmes contributed to creating an enabling 
environment for social and political action in support of empowerment and 
accountability, by focusing on how they developed partnerships with non-state 
actors in civil society. Through exercising support to these actors, the 
programmes effectively addressed the problem of elite capture of voices in local 
settings and maintained local citizen ability to demand accountability. However, 
increasing constraints on civic spaces and the absence of robust local 
government undermined the long-term gains of these initiatives after the AAWAZ 
forums came to an end. 
Growing restrictions on civic society space increased in pace during 2017, 
enhancing risks and widening the gulf between citizens and government bodies 
during both programmes’ life cycles ((interview U. Khanzada, 6 December 2019). 
The current absence of local government and shrinking civic space have made it 
more challenging to build upon the achievements of programmes such as 
AAWAZ and CDIP. One expert who has worked on both programmes with DAI, 
believes that today civic space has shrunk so much that instead of challenging 
laws and serving as a watchdog, now the focus of civil society activism is on 
adhering to or implementing existing laws. ‘The military and agencies have a role 
in the government and it cannot be challenged now. Even the media is not free’ 
(interview Z. Noel, 6 December 2019). 
When AAWAZ began its work in the districts they had to obtain NOCs from the 
Punjab and KP provincial governments, even though DAI was the implementing 
agency and they were working with four major national NGOs. By the middle of 
the programme, the provincial governments started insisting on being notified 
about every activity (interview U. Khanzada, 6 December 2019). AAWAZ was 
disallowed from working in some areas of district Mianwali in Punjab (interview 
M. Shahbaz, 6 February 2020). The NOC process proved time-consuming and 
onerous, making it one of the biggest challenges facing the programme. In 
Multan district two implementing consortia members (SPO and SAP-PK) 
eventually had their own NOCs withdrawn (interview M. Mughal, 19 December 
2019). 
CDIP did not subcontract any organisations for the voter registration campaign 
because of the shrinking civic space and increased NOC requirements. DAI, as 
a corporate entity and implementing partner was subject to fewer requirements 
for permission than a civil society organisation. Building on its advantage of 
fewer operational risks, it was still able to use AAWAZ human resources to 
facilitate a successful campaign for voter registration under CDIP. Respondents 
note this was a key factor in their success, given that the restrictions on civil 
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society would have prevented them from achieving their targets by requiring 
NOCs for each activity. They only used the sub-grant model to fund CSOs for the 
campaign in FATA because they had no cluster coordinators in place in these 
areas (interview N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020). 
Security and intelligence agencies nevertheless remain a significant challenge 
for civil society organisations, the more so if they receive donor programme 
funding. One CDIP campaign leader with experience of working in both KP and 
Punjab observed that CSOs need to avoid seeing themselves as parallel to the 
state and become more transparent and accountable in order to avoid hurdles. 
The district of Multan is marked as a red-zone by security agencies, because of 
the proliferation of extremist organisations based in South Punjab. Security 
agencies even picked up AAWAZ staff members for questioning, sent police to 
stop their activities, and stopped hotels from hosting programme events. Yet due 
to SPO’s good reputation and standing in communities, based on its previous 
years of work, the state did not ban the programme altogether (interview K. 
Fayyaz, 14 January 2020). Engagement from higher levels – government 
officials, board members of consortium partner NGOs, and others was needed 
on various occasions to push back security agencies (CDIP Cluster Coordinators 
Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019).  
Lack of government responsiveness to citizen initiatives may reflect this growing 
distrust of citizen action. People mobilised through AAWAZ complain of sending 
in applications, emboldened by awareness of the right to information, only to be 
disheartened by receiving no response from government departments. Since 
DFID was investing large amounts of money on health and education support 
within these districts, the government was not as resistant to working with 
AAWAZ as it could have been, yet there was still no real change in terms of 
accountability (interview M. Mughal, 19 December 2019). NADRA, the 
government body that issues identity cards and registers voters, has been 
accused of distrusting NGOs and confusing AAWAZ programme staff with NGO 
work. During Tabeer’s voter registration campaign it became helpful for workers 
to affiliate themselves with the Election Commission of Pakistan as a means of 
validation and protection in the field. The role that CDIP played to establish a 
strong working relationship between NADRA and ECP helped to expedite voter 
registration and add credibility to campaign efforts, further mitigating the risks to 
actors on the ground. 
In Pakistan the cost of shrinking civic space may be higher than in other contexts 
because of the important role civil society organisations play in empowerment 
and accountability efforts. Respondents observe that shrinking space is 
weakening the social contract and democratic governance. In order to optimise 
the work of CSOs one option is to work at the grassroots more actively through 
political parties and the use of digital platforms to amplify citizen voice (interview 
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N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020). Meanwhile DFID and other donors now prefer to 
work with organisations which can obtain NOCs, although leading advocacy 
NGOs with years of experience are finding their permissions withdrawn. One 
expert believes donors and CSOs need to come together to advocate against 
government curtailing the role of civil society (interview S. Khan, 17 January 
2020). 
11.1 Adapting to risk and security concerns 
All donor programmes in Pakistan are forced to contend with the implications of 
closing civic spaces for achieving their goals. Increased scrutiny by intelligence 
agencies and government restrictions on NGOs emerged towards the end of 
AAWAZ. Programme staff were on occasion taken away for investigation by 
police or intelligence officials. CDIP faces similar constraints in its engagement 
with civil society, as a result DAI no longer subcontracts any NGOs or CBOs for 
its women voter registration campaign, although it initially did so when it worked 
through the Aagahi centres (interview N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020). 
At times DFID was required to exercise its influence with government and the 
bureaucracy in Pakistan in order to overcome political hurdles that DAI faced in 
implementing AAWAZ in certain districts. The design of AAWAZ 2 has been 
responsive to the growing discomfiture in government with citizen engagement 
programmes, by engaging with UN agencies, thus reducing the suspicion the 
state may have with its agenda (interview Z. Noel, 6 December 2019).  
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12. Impact on context and actors for 
empowerment and accountability 
Both programmes helped to nurture active citizenry and promote social cohesion 
in the face of severe constraints on civil society and weak democratic institutions. 
It emerged through programme implementation that it was possible to counteract 
the social and political discord related to the political conflict characterised by 
growing extremism and militancy through conflict pre-emption activities. 
Government bodies at the district and local levels gave a mixed response to 
accountability claims from communities.  
AAWAZ forums used peace mapping and power analysis exercises effectively to 
help identify conflict triggers and pre-emption strategies. A review found the 
exercises themselves brought communities together, working as active agents to 
preserve peace (DFID 2016). Field staff cite examples of bringing inter-faith 
communities together before religious holidays to discuss ways to avoid clashes 
during Christmas, holi, or Muharram celebrations. Aagahi centre resource people 
in Multan, from different religious communities, met members of different faiths 
for the first time during these interactions and began a practice of attending each 
other’s festivals. AAWAZ forum members brought together religious leaders of 
the two main religious sects, Shias and Sunnis, to preach peace between the 
two communities (AAWAZ Aagahi Centre Resource Persons Focus Group 
Discussion, 13 January 2020). For domestic violence related conflicts, AAWAZ 
forum members and resource people would engage with the perpetrator’s family 
members, community elders and local religious leaders to collectively pressure 
him to change his behaviour (AAWAZ Aagahi Centre Resource Persons Focus 
Group Discussion, 13 January 2020). Even when AAWAZ shifted its conflict 
focus to the prevention of domestic violence, field research in both districts 
showed it was able to carry out its activities without insurmountable obstacles 
from within communities. 
The AAWAZ structure built upon the experience, credibility, networks and social 
capital of leading development NGOs in Pakistan. DAI entered into formal 
partnerships with four of these NGOs, which in turn worked with CBOs in the 
districts they managed. The AAWAZ Team Leader at DAI was a former chief 
executive with SPO, one of the AAWAZ consortium partners, and a prominent 
civil society activist. All four national partner NGOs brought their experience of 
building local networks and a framing of empowerment and accountability to bear 
on how AAWAZ was designed and implemented (interview H. Khalique, 5 
December 2019; interview N. Khalid, 17 January 2020). These organisations, in 
particular Aurat Foundation, had a history of leading rights-based advocacy in 
Pakistan along with experience in community mobilisation.  
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Thus, individuals engaged with AAWAZ straddled civil society activism in their 
personal and professional engagement. Team Leader Khalique explained his 
vision of the programme was to mobilise a grass-roots women’s movement, 
shifting from what he saw as an upper class and urban bias to the current 
women’s movement in Pakistan. Mumtaz Mughal, who led Aurat Foundation’s 
collaboration with AAWAZ, was herself a senior activist with the women’s 
movement. 
AAWAZ led to significant capacity-building of CBOs and human resource 
development amongst individuals in communities (interview S. U. Khan, 17 
January 2020). Due to the growing difficulty for civil society organisations to 
overcome registration requirements and obtain NOCs, the second phase of 
AAWAZ is unlikely to collaborate with many of the same national or local 
organisations whose capacity was enhanced during the first phase. 
The programme engaged locals in each district who were familiar with the 
cultural norms and context, and as a result did not encounter high levels of 
community resistance. Instead, they reported the resistance came from 
institutions. For example, when communities raised demands about 
mismanagement in government schools, these institutions resisted accountability 
and there was backlash. Other institutions exhibiting resistance included local 
hospitals, Basic Health Units, and any government institutions they approached 
for information under the Right to Information Act (CDIP Cluster Coordinators 
Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019). 
The AAWAZ consortium partners and women in the communities report the 
biggest barriers to mobilising women were patriarchal cultural norms, and 
resistance from local influential and religious scholars. From the village level up, 
AAWAZ worked with the male family and household members of the mobilised 
women, to sensitize both about the rights of women. Thus, both men and women 
reported stories of personal transformation (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus 
Group Discussion, 19 December 2019). 
At first, when AAWAZ encouraged women to take their applications for 
assistance to government departments, the women were reluctant. Both women 
district managers and community representatives found officials dismissive, 
usually only their male colleagues were taken seriously. One strategy to counter 
this was the khuli katcheri- open courts that included government representatives 
and heard complaints from amongst the public. Engaging in these katcheris 
improved women’s confidence and sensitised officials to take them seriously 
(CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019). An 
absent local government during part of AAWAZ’s duration limited its efficiency 
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(AAWAZ Aagahi Centre Resource Persons Focus Group Discussion, 13 January 
2020). 
The programmes interacted synergistically to achieve high impact in the area of 
increased women’s political participation. For AAWAZ this was a component of 
its broader approach to gender empowerment, whereas for CDIP increasing 
women’s voter registration was a component of its commitment to increasing 
citizen participation in democratic processes. Aagahi centre resource people 
developed skills and networks which were both personally empowering and also 
often leveraged for CDIP’s voter registration work after AAWAZ ended. The 
interaction effect of the two programmes strengthened women’s capacity to 
counter patriarchal and elite capture of democratic processes at the local level by 
providing them opportunities to engage with elected officials and participate in 
voting. 
The broader context for gender empowerment and democratic consolidation in 
Pakistan has undermined the programmes’ goals in the long run. Closing civil 
society space and increased government distrust of social and political action 
has led to a clampdown against activists involved in contentious politics. The 
religious right has taken political and legal steps to curb the nationwide feminist 
marches on International Women’s Day, known as the Aurat Marches, which 
demand gender empowerment and an end to sexual violence and harassment. 
Local government elections in KP and Punjab are delayed, while debates over 
the delimitation of new constituencies based on the latest census results are 
likely to delay elections in Sindh.  
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The two UK-funded programmes compared in this empirical study provide 
valuable lessons for how a major donor enables and supports social and political 
action for empowerment and accountability in a fragile context such as Pakistan. 
The two programmes were designed to work in synergy with significant overlap 
in their goals. Their interaction effects emerged clearly at multiple levels. First, 
both CDIP and AAWAZ were based on PEA and CAR analysis of the context 
and shared a similar vision in support of stabilising and consolidating an inclusive 
democracy in Pakistan. Second it was both fortuitous, and strategic that DAI 
served as implementing partner in both programmes. This was critical to 
ensuring that the demand-side of CDIP used the programme structure and 
human resources of AAWAZ to good effect, which was the third level of 
interaction. This continued even after the AAWAZ programme came to an end, 
through Tabeer’s funding of Aagahi centres, and its later hiring of Aagahi centre 
resource people, to achieve its demand-side goals of increased women’s voter 
registration. 
Donor programmes to nurture civil society space and empower citizens appear 
even more valuable where the gains of a democratic transition may be rapidly 
slipping away. Due to the drivers of Pakistan’s fragility, external pressures on 
democratic spaces and civil society remained high during the two programmes’ 
life cycles, therefore enhancing the external donor’s value in enabling an 
environment for citizen voice in social and political action. Both programmes’ 
partnerships with major civil society organisations and actors were vital to 
maintaining civic spaces and facilitating citizen relationships with government 
actors to promote accountability, thus ensuring a positive impact on the local 
context. Although CDIP creatively built upon the local human resource 
developed by AAWAZ, the citizen’s forums set up by the latter programme 
ceased to exist after it ended. This may not have been a setback to AAWAZ’s 
gains towards nurturing citizen engagement with democratic processes if elected 
local bodies were empowered and functional in the meantime, but this is not the 
case. New local government elections in both Punjab and KP have been pending 
since 2019. In June 2020 DFID itself was merged into the UK Foreign Office, 
now renamed the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). 
The structure of CSSF programming will evolve alongside this major 
development. CDIP will have another phase, as improving governance and 
strong inclusive institutions in Pakistan remain key objectives for the UK, 
however the details are as yet unclear. 
To sustain its work today any external actor engaged in supporting citizen action 
and nurturing democratic space will need to balance the need for a good working 
relationship with the government with its commitment to citizen empowerment. In 
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the process, it will need to ensure its existing programmes remain both adaptive 
and closely interactive to leverage the human resources on the ground built up 
over years of engagement with civil society organisations and the communities in 
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A1 Donor programmes in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab 
Table A1.1 Donor programmes in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab 
Organisation Programme Major outcomes Implementing partners 
World Bank  Economic Revitalisation 
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
and Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas 
(2011-2020), 
US$ 20000000 
Economic recovery and revitalisation of the crisis 
affected areas of KP and FATA by creating 
sustainable employment opportunities through 
rehabilitation of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs).  
Government of Pakistan, 
FATA/Merged Area Secretariat, 
SMEDA KP, Department of 
Industries 
World Bank  KP/FATA Governance 
Reforms, (2011-2016), 
US$8,750,000 
To strengthen the capacity of the government 
departments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and 
Balochistan.  
FATA Secretariat, Government 
of Balochistan & KP 





To assist in the early recovery of families affected 
by the militancy crisis, promote child health, and 
strengthen emergency response safety net delivery 
systems in FATA. 
Government of Pakistan, 
NADRA 
World Bank  KP Southern Area 
Development Project, 
(2013-2019), US$ 18 
million 
To strengthen the capacity of the poor to improve 
their livelihood options through access to social and 
productive infrastructure using participatory 
approaches in the selected southern districts of KP.  
KP provincial govt depts. Local 
Government, Elections & Rural 
Development Department, 
Economic Affairs Division 
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Organisation Programme Major outcomes Implementing partners 





To improve livelihoods & access to basic service 









Strengthen Government, media and civil society 
capacity to implement and monitor programmes 
with demonstrable impact against extremism and 
violence. 
German (GIZ) GMBH 
European 
Union  
Afghan refugees in Iran 
and Pakistan, and of 
returnees in Afghanistan 
(2015-2017), 
EUR45,692,673 
The overall objective is to contribute to the 
protection of Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan 
and returnees in Afghanistan, and to promote the 
search for durable solutions. 
United Nations High 




based measures to curb 
VAWG (2014-2017), 
EUR509,091 
Contribute to enhanced social and collective action 
in local communities to detect, prevent and respond 
to VAWG, specifically domestic violence & forced 
marriage. KP and Punjab.  
KirkensNodhjelpForening 




Strengthened capacity of courts, increased access 
to justice, improved police services, legal aid & 
representation mechanism for men, women and 
other vulnerable groups in KP. (KP) 
UNDP 
USAID FATA Transition & 
Recovery (2015-2021)  
US$25,097,291 (DFID: 
$1,585,000) 
Support government in contributing to economic, 
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Organisation Programme Major outcomes Implementing partners 




Build capacity for effective agency/district level 
governance, provide technical assistance to policy-
making at federal, provincial & agency level. (FATA) 
UNDP 
USAID Strengthening Electoral 




Technical assistance to ECP, Electoral laws and 
procedures strengthened, improved engagement of 
citizens, particularly women and youth, in electoral 








Strengthening local governance mechanisms and 





Youth and Social 
Cohesion project (2015-
2021), US$1,635,323 
Enable communities in conflict-prone areas of KP to 








Community Resilience - 
Vulnerability Reduction, 
Improved Cohesion and 
Empowerment (2013-
2019), US$1,037,915 
Restore livelihood of refugees, rehabilitate 
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A2 List and number of interviews 




Level Name of Programme 





1  2  
Implementing Partner 
Team Leader 1  1 1  
Deputy Team 
Leader 
 1   
Team Member 3 1  
Partner NGOs 
National Manager  3  
District and Union Council Staff 
District Managers 3  
Resource 
Persons  


















Partner Donor  
UNDP (SELP) 3    
TOTAL 13 18 3  
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A3 Interviews and focus group discussions 
AAWAZ Aagahi Centre Resource Persons (2020) Focus Group Discussion, facilitated by K. Qidwai, 16 
January, Dera Ismail Khan 
AAWAZ Aagahi Centre Resource Persons (2020) Focus Group Discussion, facilitated by A. Khan, 13 
January, Multan 
AAWAZ District Forum Members (2020) Focus Group Discussion, facilitated by S. Javed, 16 January, Dera 
Ismail Khan 
AAWAZ Forum Members (2020) Interviewed by K. Qidwai and S. Javed, 13 January, Multan 
Ali, N.T. (2020) Interviewed by K. Qidwai, 4 February, Karachi 
Fayyaz, K. (2020) Interviewed by A. Khan, 14 January, Multan 
Goraya, A. (2020) Interviewed by A. Khan, 6 December, Islamabad 
Jilani, J. (2020) Correspondence with A. Khan, 6 October 
Khalid, N. (2020) Interviewed by A. Khan, 17 January, Karachi 
Khalique, H. (2019) Interviewed by A. Khan, 5 December, Karachi 
Khan, S. (2020) Interviewed by K. Qidwai and S. Javed, 17 January, Dera Ismail Khan 
Khan, S. U. (2020) Interviewed by K. Qidwai and S. Javed, 17 January, Dera Ismail Khan 
Khanzada, U. (2019) Interviewed by A. Khan, 6 December, Islamabad 
Mughal, M. (2019) Interviewed by K. Qidwai, 19 December, Islamabad 
Nance, D. (2019) Interviewed by A. Khan, 6 December, Islamabad 
Noel, Z. (2019) Interviewed by A. Khan, 6 December, Islamabad 
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